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1.0 INTRODUCTION 
Zimbabwe was one of the few African countries that received 
international acclaim or recognition for its '"success" story in 
agricultural development in the 19 8Os. This recognition was 
generally but mistakenly equated with the elimination of hunger 
among the Zimbabwean population. Zimbabwe was obviously food 
secure at the national level during the early to late 1980s and had 
on several occasions exported maize to its neighbouring countries 
during the first 10 years of independence. The positive 
contribution of the peasant/communal sector to this national food 
self-sufficiency since the early 1980s could not go unnoticed. 
This was regarded as having been a response to the progressive role 
played by the state in advancing an effective agricultural 
incentive package which included better prices, extension, credit, 
marketing facilities etc. 
However, a less acknowledged side of this "success" story was the 
emergence of considerable evidence to the effect that actually 
Zimbabwe had a food insecurity paradox, because the tremendous 
production growth among the communal farmers and hence the full 
grain silos, were coexisting with considerable transitory and 
chronic hunger and malnutrition among certain social and geograghic 
sections of the population. Such a contradiction normally arises 
in developing economies like Zimbabwe with a large peasantry 
because incorrect assumptions are made by the policy makers 
concerning this large segment of the population. One general 
assumption~is that peasants produce for own consumption and that 
they are self-sufficient in agricultural production. It is further 
assumed that they have enough basic resources for peasant 
production, but would probably need an incentive package in order 
to produce exLra for the national markets. Zimbabwe generally, 
operated under such assumptions during the first decade of 
independence, advanced a marketing package to the farmers and 
experienced a sharp increase in the market share of maize and 
cotton from the communal a reas. This gave rise to the "success" 
story picture. 
However, because of oversight and lack of correct understanding of 
the peasant economy in question, the national "success" story in no 
time co-existed with extreme poverty, hunger and child malnutrition 
at household level in the communal areas and among commercial farm 
and low income urban families. A postmortem of the Zimbabwean 
experience with food and nutrition policies gives rise to several 
important questions which need attention before policy 
reformulation. Some of these questions are: 
1. How is rural production organised, i.e. what is the 
distribution of the means of production (land, labour and 
capital) across the households? Who owns these farming 
means, ',vho does the actual farming and who controls the 
distribution of the farm produce (gender issues)? 
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2. Are peasants self-sufficient in food production? 
3. Who among the peasant community is producing for the market 
and why and who is not producing for the market and why? 
4. What are the causes of child malnutrition - and who in the 
community are most affected? 
5. What is the level of purchasing power and food distribution 
network in the communal areas? 
6. What have been the coping strategies under food insecurity 
situations? 
Answering such questions will shed light on the poverty levels to 
be tackled, the food security situation and structural rigidities 
in the target population. Answers should help in mapping out 
correct policies for this usually very large part of the 
population. 
This paper discusses Zimbabwe's agricultural policies in the 1980s 
and how these led to the "success" story; the distribution of this 
national success among the population; the emerging problems of 
hunger and malnutrition and their relationship to poverty, food 
production and distribution. Finally, some thoughts are given on 
the possible integration of agricultural and nutrition policy 
during the 1990s and beyond. 
2. 0 A HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE AGRICULTURAL SECTOR IN ZIMBABWE 
Even though the duality of the Zimbabwean economy inherited at 
independenae is a well knovm factor to those familiar with the 
economic history of the country, it does no harm to highlight this 
phenomenon again as the starting point of this discussion. The 
dual economy inherited ln 1980 consisted of a well developed 
commercial sector and a neglected rural economy. Land distribution 
was highly skewed with less than 1% of the population (the white 
large scale commercial farmers) owning about 50% of the land. The 
large scale commercial farming sector (LSCF) consisted of over 
6 000 large farms of on average 2 500 hectares and the communal 
areas (CAs) consisted of about 500 000 very small holdings (less 
than 5 hectares) in comparison to those in the LSCF. The LSCF, 
serviced with good credit, extension and market support and also 
located in the best ecological/natural regions I and II, had yields 
almost 4 times those obtained in the communal areas 1 • Almost 90% 
of the communal areas were in the poorer ecological regions III, IV 
and V carrying about (60 - 75)% of the population. 
More -chan 6 7% of the communal areas 
carrylng capacity with respect to 
exceeded their recommended 
both human and livestock 
':'here are five agroecological/natural regions in Zimbabwe on the basis of 
soil type and rainfall pattern. Conditions for arable farming progressively 
cieterio=ate as one moves from natural region I to V i.e soils become poorer and 
rainfal~ ~s lower and more erratic. 
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population densities and this resulted in environmental degradation 
of a serious magnitude. More than 50% of the families had less 
than 5 hectares of arable which is considered to be the minimum for 
basic subsistence and 6% - 12% were landless. About 30% - 33% of 
the families were cattleless and draught power was generally in 
short supply in the communal areas, with some animals dying in the 
prolonged drought conditions and poor management of the grazing 
land (Central Statistical Office, 1982). In 1980 only 2% of the 
communal area farmers received credit; extension and market 
facilities were scarce and generally the farmers lacked adequate 
support services (Amin and Chipika 1989; Agritex 1989) 2 • Loss of 
male labour through migration into towns in search of jobs resulted 
in household economies which were highly dependent on remittances 
for their food needs and the purchase of agricultural inputs 
(Bonnevie 1987). All these factors resulted in the natural 
evolution of a society in which a few better-off farmers had 
managed to survive through the harsh conditions while the majority 
were poor households struggling to survive. 
3.0 AGRICULTURAL POLICY THRUST IN THE 1980s 
In an attempt to redress this inherited situation, policy 
statements in the First Five Year National Development Plan (1986) 
for example, included the need for a land reform and the efficient 
utilisation of land; raising living standards especially for the 
rural population; increased employment opportunities; development 
of science and technology and the balance between environment and 
development. As far a s agriculture was concerned the policy thrust 
in the early 1980s cou l d be seen as having been targetted at three 
major objectives: 
1. stimulating large scale production; 
2. stimulating small farmer cash and food crop production and 
marketing; and 
3. stabilising national food supplies. 
These policy thrusts were adopted in order to ensure national food 
self- sufficiency, improve communal area household incomes and 
general standards of living in an effort to redress urban-rural and 
racial imbalances or inequalities inherited at independence, to 
save and earn more of the much needed foreign currency and also to 
consolidate political power and support in the rural areas. 
Several less interventionist strategies were used as a package in 
order to achieve these goals. The output price incentive for major 
food and cash crops was introduced with the nominal prices of maize 
and cotton rising by about 80% in the first 10 years. This was 
introduced as a blankeL policy to the whole agricultural sector. 
2 The ratio of the number of extension workers to communal area farmers was 
1 :1 20 0 in 1980 but by 1 98 8 it had improved t o 1: 8 00 after deliberate efforts by the 
s tate to improve support t o c ommunal farmers (Agritex 1989). 
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Guaranteed markets f"or small grains (millets, sorghum etc) were 
provided in an effort to encourage their production in the marginal 
areas of the country. There was an improvement in the services 
provided by agricultural institutions to small farmers such as 
extension advice, marketing, credit and agricultural research. 
From 1979/80 to 1985/86, credit to communal farmers increased about 
50 times in amount and about 3 0 times in the number of loans; 
marketing depots, extension agents were all increased 
significantly3 • Credit was given in the form of a crop package, 
that is improved seed, fertilizer etc 4 • 
Regarding the more interventionist policies, some 2. 8 million 
hectares of former large scale farm land abandoned or underutilised 
because of the war were purchased for resettlement. By 1987 2.37 
million hectares had been resettled with 40 000 families. Up to 
1986 yields were reported to be 88% of those planned despite the 
drought and other problems of new settlements. However, 
performance has been found to differ across schemes in different 
regions and also between owners and non-owners of cattle. On the 
whole however, the pace of resettlement has not been very 
significant in comparison to the target of 237 000 families planned 
for resettlement during the first 10 years of independence 1981 -
1990. By July 1990 only a total of 52 000 families, which is about 
22% of the numbers planned, had been resettled (~he Herald, 26 July 
1990) 5 • 
The aggreg~te results of these agricultural policies adopted 
between 1980 to 1986 form the "success" story of Zimbabwe's 
agriculture in the 1980s. During this period per capita cereal 
production increased by 80%, aggregate food production had an 
annual growth rate of about 2.5%, agricultural output growth rate 
3 The number of AFC loans to communal areas rose from 2 850 in 1979/80 to 97 
761 in 1985/86 and during the same period the quantity o f loans to communal areas 
increased from Z$478 000 to Z$52 189 000 (Amin 1988). In 1980 total GMB depots were 
34 of which only 3 were in communal areas but by 1986 the GMB directly controlled 
51 depots of which 20 were in communal areas and almost all came into existence 
after 1980. In addition to these the GHB also had 56 collection points and several 
mobile units for grain collection from the rural areas (Rohrbach 1989). The number 
of communal farmers registered with the GMB rose from 60 000 in 1981 to 295 981 in 
1986 (Thomson 1988; Rohrbach 1989) and by the end of the decade, the GMB controlled 
about 60% to 86% of maize marketed from communal areas (Harriss 1986). 
4 Fertilizer delivered to communal areas increased from 25 000 metric tons in 
1978/79 to 115 000 tons in 1985/86. During the same period improved seed delivered 
to communal areas increased from 4 500 metric tons to 31 000 tons. 
This slow progress in land re-distribution has been blamed on several 
factors including the lack o.f finance, the 1villing buyer - willing seller basis 
imposed by the Lancaster House constitution on the acquisition of land, lack of 
suitable land availability on the market and probably the general state policy which 
was in favour of gradual rather than radical reforms in the economy as a whole. 
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was about 3.5%, maize output doubled as did the area under maize 
cropping and by 1986 there were 2 million tonnes of maize in stock 
and this was nearly 3 years' supply. By 1989 the communal areas 
supplied about 63% of marketed maize, 90% of sunflower and an 
increasing share of cotton. All this indicated that communal 
farmers were responsive to economic policy stimulants. 
However, around 1987, because of increasing transport bottlenecks 
and other constraints on the economy, and also because of the 
apparent relaxation on the part of the state following the 
"success" story, the efforts to distribute seed, fertilizer etc to 
the communal areas either stopped or became minimal. As a result, 
the "success" story became gloomy. In addition, during the second 
half of the 1980s decade, the national economy as a whole was 
generally stagnating. Unemployment, inflation and the government 
budget deficit were all on the increase. In response to this 
economic crisis, the government of Zimbabwe adopted the IMP/World 
Bank supported Economic Structural Adjustment Program (ESAP) in 
1990. The short-run hardships of ESAP were unfortunately worsened 
by the effects of the worst drought in Southern Africa during the 
1991/92 agricultural season. Zimbabwe having exported all the food 
reserves under the recommendations of ESAP found itself importing 
maize at 3 times the domestic price a few months later. The food 
crisis reached its peak during this period. 
4.0 CHILD WELFARE POLICY THRUST IN THE 1980s 
At independence one of the priorities of government was to improve 
health conditions for the large black population segment who had 
been disadvantaged during the colonial times. In order to achieve 
this, government adopted a "free"/state financed primary health 
care system. The first decade of independence was characterised by 
infrastructure rehabilitation and provision in the form of new 
clinics and hospitals, schools, bridges, roads, water and 
sanitation facilities to once neglected communities. As a result, 
immunisation coverage expanded from 25% to over 85% of all the 
children bet>:1een 19 8 0 and 19 8 9 (Government of Zimbabwe, November 
1992). Infant mortality rate declined from 88 to 61 per 1 000 live 
births, while weight-for-age child malnutrition declined from 21% 
to about 12% during the same period. Thus, child malnutrition 
concerns in Zimbabwe were just part of the broad policy on health 
and child welfare which was primarily the responsibility of the 
Ministry of Health. Nutrition policies were not purposely linked 
to agricultural policies during the first decade of independence. 
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5.0 ZIHBABWE'S FOOD INSECURITY PARADOX 
While the agricultural policies of the early 1980s seemed to 
concentrate mainly on redressing some historical national 
imbalances, 6 their impact on the rural economy went unchecked 
and/or unnoticed for the first 5 or so years of independence. This 
led to a perpetuation and worsening of inequalities among the rural 
population. In other words, in 1980 national imbalances were such 
an overiding phenomenon to the extent that intra-communal and 
intra-household inequalities were not considered to be an important 
issue to be addressed by policy. 
A postmortem of the "success" story however, reveals a highly 
skewed distribution of the successes. Surveys conducted on some of 
the communal areas seem to indicate that state support in most 
cases reached only the few better-off parts of the community and 
not the majority poorer households. Thus, about 25% of the 
communal farmers received credit by the mid-1980s, indicating how 
extension services still generally favoured the better-off but 
minority master farmers (Chipika 1987; Vengesa 1985) 7 • Likewise, 
whereas the whole of the communal areas were responsible for about 
50% of the maize and cotton deliveries to the Grain and Cotton 
Marketing Boards by the mid-1980s, the overall performance when 
disaggregated showed extreme regional inequalities. For example, 
communal areas in the 3 higher rainfall provinces of Mashonaland 
West, East and Central (and these are only 18 out of the 17 0 
communal areas in the country ) contributed about 70% of the maize 
"surplus" in good years and up to 90% in drought years (Amin and 
Chipika 1989). In contrast, the overcrowded communal areas in the 
drier natural regions IV and V, amounting to 5 provinces, provided 
6 Remernber that resett lement :-, as not been effective in redressing the national 
land imbalance, but the other less i~terventioni st agricultural policies involving 
institutional re - orientation seem to have had a significant impact on the farming 
sector. 
In the communal areas of the Masvingo province, Chipika (1987), found that 
90% of the cattless households \Vere non master farmers while 88% of households with 
10 or more cattle were master farmers or trainees. Master farmers farmed on average 
2.4 to 4.1 hectares \Vhile non master farmers had on average 1.66 to 2.4 hectares. 
Encouraged to use higher yielding technologies, the master farmers performed better 
with an average maize yield of 36 to 39 90-kg bags per hectare and recording higher 
market sales while the non master farmers averaged 15 to 19 bags per hectare and 
recorded lower sales. Vengesa ( 1985), obtained similar results for Mashonaland 
Central. These studies seem to indicate that state policies on extension and 
marketing tended to impact mostly the better - off-far~ers deepening further the 
inherent inequalities .in these communal areas and leaving behind a relatively large 
group of poor, less endowed households faced with food insecurity. At the moment 
however, Agritex is experimenting with the method of farmer groups in an effort to 
reach the poorer farmers and reduce the noted imbalance (Truscott 1985; Bratton 
19 87). 
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between 10 - 3 0% maize sales to official markets 3 • Thus, large 
groups of the pourer farmers with little or no cattle, labour and 
poor land were excluded from the increased production of the 1980s 
and for them land reorganisation alone would not solve the problems 
of low production and low standards of living. The main problem in 
rural agriculture currently manifests itself in three facets: as a 
general poverty, food insecurity and child malnutrition. The three 
are interdependent and they will be discussed in that context. 
5 .1.1 
Poverty, Food Ins~curity And Child Malnutrition: 
The Evidence 
Even though Zimbabwe could boast of national food self-sufficiency 
during the 1980s 9 , holding in stock 30 35% more than the 
estimated domestic requirements, 10 it could not boast of adequate 
food security at the household level. This household food 
insecurity significantly surfaced through the high levels of under-
five child malnutrition ln the communities of commercial farm 
workers, communal farmers, resettlement farmers and domestic 
workers. Using the weight-for-age index, it had been found out 
that malnutrition nationwide affected about 1 in 6 Zimbabwean 
children between 2 - 5 years old and was as high as 25 - 30% in the 
drier southern regions of the country. Stunting, an indicator of 
chronically inadequate food intakes affected about 30% of 
Zimbabwe's 2 - 5 year olds and was as high as 37% in Matebeleland 
South province (Central Statistical Office 1988; Ministry of Health 
1985, 1987~ 1988 and 1989). All this was a significant pointer to 
the existence of chronic food insecurity especially in the drier 
communal lands in addition to transitory food insecurity caused by 
drought. 
The causes of malnutrition are many but among those currently cited 
as high ranking in Zimbabwe are: inadequate and inappropriate food 
distribution, poverty as reflected in the poor socio- economic 
status and generally poor health conditions. Surveys conducted in 
the Mashonaland West and Hatebeleland Sout.h provinces of Zimbabwe 
3 The consistently highest maize selling communal areas over time have been: 
Mangwende (Mashonaland E), Hurungwe (Mash. W), Chiweshe (Mash. Central), Guruve 
(Mash. Central), Zvimba (Mash.\~), Mukwichi (Mash.W), Chinamhora (Mash.E), Uzumba 
(Mash.E), Chirau (Mash. 'il), Husana (Mash. Central), Chikwaka (Mash. E), Wedza 
(Mash. E), Kandeya (Mash. Central), Hadziwa (Hash. Central), Mhondoro (Mash.W), 
Chiduku and Sabinorth in Manicaland. 
9 President Mugabe received the World Hunger 
international recognition for the country's efforts in 
success. 
Prize as a symbol of 
sustaining agricultural 
10 The Herald 14/6/90 p.4, Zimbabwe's major newspaper, reported that the 
country was heading for another huge food surplus , 35% more than the domestic 
requirements. 
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between 1987 and 1992 clearly demonstrate the existence of marked 
inequalities ln the socio-economic status of rural households. 
(Chipika and Amin 1992, 1993). Hashonaland West is one of the 
provinces ranking high in "surplus" maize production and is under 
natural regions II and III, while Hatebeleland South is a dry, 
mainly livestock ranching economy in the worst natural regions IV 
and V. The research findings showed that despite the extreme 
agroecological differences in the two provinces studied only about 
6 - 10% of the peasant households could be described as relatively 
successful in both areas while about 20% in Hashonaland West and as 
much as 70% in Hatebeleland South were households in absolute 
poverty. These absolute poverty households had little or no means 
of production and external lncomes for survival 11 • It was the 
small 10% relatively successful peasantry who were mostly 
responsible for increased agricultural output sales to national 
markets, thus providing the "success" story picture during the 
1980s while overshadowing massive poverty and suffering in these 
areas. In both areas studied it was noted that between 75 - 90% of 
the households had incomes far below their rural poverty datum 
lines. Approximately 40 - 50% of the households were chronically 
food insecure in terms of both their own production and purchasing 
power. Poverty and food insecurity were concentrated in the 
absolutely poor category as expected, but were also significantly 
present in the middle peasantry. Child malnutrition surveys showed 
stunting levels of 32 - 36%. Again these were in the middle and 
absolutely poor peasant categories, showing that general poverty 
has a bearing on food insecurity and child malnutrition levels in 
the rural .. areas. P..ny policies of agriculture and nutrition 
therefore need to take into account these specific historically 
stable socio-economic structures in order to have targetted impact. 
Besides looking at the poor soclo economic status of rural 
households as the cause of food insecurity, one also needs to 
understand the paradox of hunger in a food surplus nation in terms 
of the distribution of purchasing power and food accessibility 
among the population. This is because f ood security is a matter of 
11 Evidence is also coming up ln the fi ndings under this research project 
that there lS very signltlcant gender d ifferentiation in the ownership of 
agricultural means of production and incomes in addition to the inta-household 
differentiantion so far clearly established. Traditionally women have no legal land 
user rights in the communal areas o f Zimbabwe except under special circumstances of 
say, the death of the male head o f household. The research results in Mashonaland 
West are indicating that \-!Omen d o not mvn l and, draught animals and important 
agricultural implements in male headed households. Women are however the major 
performers of agricultural production activities whose output distribution is 
controlled by the males, who own the major means of production. Contrary to common 
belief, means of production in co~~unal areas are not collectively owned in the 
households. About 90% or more of them are individually owned by those who will have 
purchased them. Women are generally disadvantaged in this respect because in the 
initial instance they are traditionally discriminated against in education and hence 
also in wage employment so that in all probability they do not have the money to 
purchase their own agricultural i mplements. Thus, they are naturally reduced to the 
role of the providers of unpaid a gricultural l abour in the rural areas. 
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access to sufficient food through either own production, purchasing 
on the market or both. 
Historically and even currently in Zimbabwe, , state agricultural 
policy has been focused on surplus grain producers: more Grain 
Marketing Board (GMB) depots for the sale of crops, producer price 
incentives, Agricultural Finance Corperation (AFC) credit recouped 
from crop sales etc. This concentration on the output and sales 
side assumes the existence of rural surplus producers. However, in 
the communal areas in natural regions IV and V where about 60% of 
the communal popula-tion lives, the majority of the households sell 
little or no grain and often must rely on market purchases in order 
to meet their food needs. This means that overall in these areas 
the sales of surplus households are not sufficient to meet the 
grain demand by deficit households. This implies that part of the 
possible solution to the problem of food insecurity in these areas 
is to ensure a reliable or constant inflow of grain at affordable 
prlces. 
However throughout the 19 8Os, the GMB, which was the marketing 
parastatal with monopoly rights over the purchase of a number of 
controlled crops, including most of the food grains, did not view 
its mandate to include the distribution of grain from surplus areas 
to deficit rural areas 12 • Thus, the GMB's unidirectional 
distribution of food crops from rural to urban centres assumed 
rural self-sufficiency in grain (Blackie 1984) which, as we have 
noticed, was a grossly misleading assumption. At the same time 
there were .. official restrictions on the movement of grain by 
private traders between Zone A (urban and commercial farming areas) 
and Zone B (communal areas) and from surplus communal areas to 
deficit communal areas (or between communal areas) unless 
sanctioned by the state in the form of drought relief food. 
Together with the fact that it was generally unprofitable for 
private traders to be involed in the grain movement business at the 
ruling selling prices, this meant that grain was collected from the 
communal areas by the GMB, channelled into urban centres for 
storage and milling, and then taken back to rural areas as 
substantial quantities of urban milled maize meal by private 
traders to be sold at significantly higher prices than locally 
milled malze (Jayne, Chigume and Hedden-Dunkhorst 19 90) . 
Therefore, this whole question of hunger and malnutrition in 
Zimbabwe's communal areas seemed to be also significantly linked to 
the food distribution system in the country. 
Coping strategies under food insecurity have included state food 
handouts/drought relief food, food-for-work programs, food relief 
programs by non-governmental organisations, child supplementary 
12 This was not surprlslng considering the added financial burdan that would 
result from the GMB distributing grain t.o several dispersed areas with poor road and 
trading facilities, when already the parastatal was operating under huge deficits. 
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feeding programs, remittances from relatives in towns, food 
purchases using non-agricultural incomes and relying on wild foods 
in some instances. 
From the above discussion, one is left wondering whether Zimbabwe's 
agricultural policies of the 1980s were indeed a "success" story of 
racing against hunger and poverty for the majority of the 
population in the communal areas. According to the evidence given 
in this paper, it seems that the policies raced too far ahead of 
the real problems which are now emerging in the form of hunger, 
malnutrition and poverty. A pause for thought on Zimbabwe's 
agricultural and nutrition policies at this moment seems most 
appropriate in order to help in the mapping of a correct strategy 
for food and nutrition in the 1990s and beyond. 
5.1.2 A Comment on Food and Nutrition Policy Making in the 1980s. 
While a food policy existed in Zimbabwe during the 1980s, the 
policy was target ted at national food self-sufficiency. This 
target was achieved at the expense of household food security. 
Throughout the first decade of independence, agricultural/food 
policies were formulated independent from nutrition policies. The -
former fell under the mandate of the Ministry of Lands, Agriculture 
and Rural Resettlement while the latter came under the Ministry of 
Health. The two parent Ministries had no formal co-ordination 
mechanisms on the issues of food and nutrition. Research findings 
now show that such a co-ordination is essential if malnutrition 
problems are to be effectively tackled. Essentially, nutrition 
objectives in agriculture should ensure the provision of a safe and 
nutritious food supply which is accessible to all segments of the 
population at all Limes. Thus, in reviewing agricultural policies 
it is important to assess their impact on the food security and 
nutritional status of the vulnerable groups. 
As a result of the research findings on food and nutrition issues 
at grassroots level and the escalating national malnutrition levels 
during the last quarter of the first decade of independence 
reviewed above, a National Steering Committee on Food and Nutrition 
( NSCFN) was formed ln 19 9 0. The NSCFN consists of seven key 
Ministries namely: Land, Agriculture and Rural Resettlement 
(Chair); Health ( Secretariat); Finance, Economic Planning and 
Development; Energy and Hater Resources Development; Education; 
Local Government, Rural and Urban Planning and Community and 
Cooperative Development. The NSCFN was tasked to: 
1. Prepare a paper highlighting the nutrition problem in Zimbabwe 
and generate debate and consultations with all concerned. 
2. Critically analise the prevailing Food and Nutrition 
situation. This would involve answering the following 
questions using a wider data-base. 
Who are the food insecure and malnourished? 
Where are they located? 
12 
Why are they malnourished? 
What are the major determinants of food insecurity? 
3. Draw policy implications for discussion with relevant sectors 
to facilitate policy reformulation. 
4. Formulate a Draft Food and Nutrition Policy Document for 
wide circulation and discussion (NSCFN paper, July 1990) •. 
So far tasks 1, 2 and 3 have largely been achieved with the help of 
research work ongoing in the University of Zimbabwe together with 
some work by non-governmental organisations. Task 4 is the crucial 
step now required in order to influence food and nutrition policy 
reformulation. 
While initiatives for formulating a Food and Nutrition Policy are 
already underway at the central government level, it is important 
for these to have the input of policy implimentors and target 
groups at grassroot level. So far there is a significant network 
of both governmental and non-governmental institutions operating at 
grassroot level on food and nutrition issues. The Ministry of 
Agriculture has the hierachy of Agricultural Extension Officers, 
Extension Supervisors, Extension Workers and farmer-groups, all 
involved in food production at grassroot level. The Ministry of 
Health and Child Welfare has District Area Co-ordinators, Nursing 
Staff and Health Workers working on nutrition and general child 
welfare at grass root l e vel. The Ministry of National Affairs, 
Employment Creation a nd Co-operatives (formely Ministry of 
Community Development and Women's Affairs) have Community Workers 
and women's clubs to deal with general health related issues, 
income gensration and c hild nutrition. In addition to these there 
are also local non-governmental organisations (NGOs) such as 
farmers clubs, unions and savings clubs; foreign developmental 
NGOs; churches and religious groups a nd community groups such as 
"nhimbe"/beer or tea parties and "mushandira pamwe"/informal 
cooperatives. All these work in the area of food and nutrition 
related issues. The grassroot network are the policy implimentors 
and also beneficiaries in some instances. Hence, they will 
determine to a significant e xte nt the success or failure of a food 
and nutritio n p o licy. 
6.0 FUTURE THRUST FOR ZIMBABWE: AGRICULTURE AND NUTRITION INTO 
THE 1990s AND BEYOND: RECOMMENDATIONS. 
Zimbabwe is certainly confronted with several challenges in 
agriculture and nutrition for the 1990s. Given the discussion in 
this paper, the following recommendations are being made: 
1. Resettlement efforts, if complemented with a restructuring of 
the communal areas which continue to hold the majority of the 
population, might promote development in the communal areas. 
Restructuring would involve rationalised land use, for example 
specific designation of arable and grazing land each being 
properly managed. Arable land also needs opportunities for 
fallowing and crop rotation, · while grazing land requires 
rotationally time to be redressed. In the good natural 
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reg1ons I and II it is possible to properly manage mixed farming 
of crop and livestock on the same land. In fact, the current 
patterns of land use in the communal areas have in most cases 
been the result of spontaneous evolution with very little 
conscious management of the land resource. 
2. However, rationalisation of land use alone will not necessarily 
solve the problems of the poorer households that have no 
livestock, little labour, no implements, cash or credit. If the 
criteria of "NEED FOR LAND" is maintained in resettlement and 
is not overtaken by the desire to favour the minority 
"efficient" master farmers, and if this access to land is 
complemented by a collective use of resources for example in 
farmer groups, provision of credit for the cattleless to buy 
cattle etc, then some of these poorer households might have 
their development efforts promoted. 
3. In addition extension services suitable for the poorer 
households need to be emphasized in the early stages of this 
aided development process, for example by stimulating the use 
of green manure in place of fertilizer which requires cash or 
loan income; use of high yielding, more drought and desease 
resistant seed varieties in place of buying chemicals; zero 
tillage in place of always needing draught animals etc. In 
other words, the constraints faced by the majority poor in 
communal areas and resettlement areas need to be thoroughly 
investigated and consciously tackled if their livelihoods are 
to be im.proved. 
4. However, as the supply and incomes side improves, something 
needs to be done abouL the food distribution system. While the 
GMB has done an undeniably successful task in reaching the 
communal farmers on the supply side, its role would be more 
consolidated if it was extended to include grain storage at 
lower levels and redistribution of grain where possible and 
especially where there is critical need. 
5. If this is too costly financially for an organisation which is 
already making losses in its operations, then probably private 
trading in grain from the GMB depots and from surplus to deficit 
areas must be encouraged as a matter of policy. In this way the 
gap left by the GMB's single-channel system could be effectively 
filled by other agencies (Jayne and Chosvo 1989). Currently, 
government has liberalised all grain trading in natural regions 
IV and V in line with the requirements of the Economic 
Structural Adjustment Program (ESAP). However, the 
introduction of complete market liberalisation in Zimbabwe's 
agriculture, as a way of running away from parastatal monopoly 
and inefficiencies is likely to be inappropriate because the 
constraints that formerly weakened private trader 
competiLiveness are still there; namely, acute transport 
problems, thinly spread out markets, long distances, heavy 
14 
initial capital outlay requirements etc. This means that 
complete market liberalisation would result in the emergence of 
a few private trader monopolies and in the reproduction of 
conditions that existed before 1980 when private traders were 
notorious for paying the desperate producers low prices and 
reselling grain at very high profits. This trend is likely to 
re-develop if a policy of complete market liberalisation is 
adopted. There is no doubt that the advent of state monopoly 
through the GMB in the communal areas actually improved the 
returns to the producers even though this was in most cases 
accompanied by administrative inefficiencies in the payment 
system. This of course could always be improved over time. 
6. Agro-based rural industrialisation would be a useful option in 
boosting rural purchasing power. Projects such as grain 
milling, edible oils and peanut butter manufacturing, baking, 
weaving, soap making,stockfeeds,fruit and vegetable processing 
etc would have the added advantage of reducing the currently 
high cost of living in the rural areas where most of these 
essentials are coming from urban centres. This would also be 
expected to have a positive impact on nutritional levels. 
7. Targetted policy making and implementation in food production, 
distribution and utilisation is important for the success of 
food and nutrition po licies. 
8. A co-ordinated approach by governmental, non-governmental and 
communit,y interested parties in t .his important matter is likely 
to produce better res u l t s t han the current fragmented setup at 
grassroot level. 
The list of possible policies has not been exhausted, but the point 
being put across here is that it pays to understand in some detail 
the livelihood strategies of the community for whom one is making 
policies in order to avoid having otherwise good policies result in 
unintended outcomes o r reach o nly the minority, as in the 
experience o f Zimbabwe. 
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